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ARBITRA T/ON VS. RULE OF LAW? 
RESPONSES 
FAIRNESS IN CIVIL RIGHTS 
ARBITRATION 
Douglas E. Abrams 
I n 1987, 62-year-old Robert Gilmer was fired by Interstate/Johnson Lane Cor-
poration, after six years as the com-
pany's financial services manager. Out 
of a job, he tried to sue Interstate in fed-
eral court. He alleged that the company 
had violated the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, which protects older 
workers from discrimination in hiring, fir-
ing, or granting benefits. In 1991, the 
Supreme Court held that Gilmer could 
not sue in court because when he was 
hired, he had signed an agreement to 
arbitrate future disputes that might arise 
between him and the company. An arbi-
trator would now hear evidence from both 
parties and render a decision binding on 
them. 
Arbitration's shortcomings, well artic-
ulated by Professor Carbonneau, are par-
ticularly disturbing when plaintiffs allege 
violation of a civil-rights statute like the 
age-discrimination act. Before the Gilmer 
decision, the Supreme Court had never 
expressly upheld civil-rights arbitration 
under the U.S. Arbitration Act. Because 
Gilmer indicated that the Court would 
now uphold arbitration of claims under 
any civil-rights statute, large corporate 
employers routinely require advance writ-
ten agreements to arbitrate claims aris-
ing from the employment relationship. A 
prospective employee who refuses to sign 
is likely not to get the job at all. Arbitra-
tion clauses enable employers to avoid 
court resolution of claims under not only 
the age-discrimination act, but also fed-
eral and state statutes prohibiting dis-
crimination based on race, national ori-
gin, creed, gender, or disability. 
Civil-rights statutes are simply too 
important to be entrusted to arbitration. 
As Professor Owen Fiss ofYale has writ-
ten, judges hold office under public 
authority, conduct trials open to the pub-
lic, and explain their decisions on the 
public record; arbitrators serve as private 
decision makers, conduct proceedings 
closed to the public, and normally com-
municate their decisions only to the par-
ties. An employer thus could hide persis-
tent civil-rights violations from public 
scrutiny by compelling all its employees 
to sign agreements to arbitrate future 
claims. Arbitration agreements also 
enable employers to keep civil-rights 
plaintiffs away from juries, which nor-
mally may award punitive damages for 
intentional discrimination while arbitra-
tors normally do not. Not only that, but 
courts rarely overturn arbitration deci-
sions, even where the arbitrator applied 
the law incorrectly or made clear mis-
takes in fact-finding. 
From my own experience serving on 
three-member arbitration panels, I 
believe most arbitrators strive to conduct 
evenhanded proceedings and to apply the 
law correctly. As a general matter, I even 
believe in arbitration's essential fairness 











































when parties voluntarily agree to arbi-
trate. These beliefs, however, are not the 
point. The point is that civil-rights claims 
are fundamentally different from other 
claims. Civil-rights statutes are public 
mandates to redress historic discrimina-
tion against particular classes or groups of 
persons. If we are to remain true to our 
ideals of equal justice under law, the final 
word in civil-rights cases must rest with 
publicly accountable courts rather than 
privately empowered arbitrators. 
A FEW BASICS ABOUT ARBITRATION 
Our system has two intimately related types of arbitration. 
"Labor arbitration," grounded 
in major federal labor 
statutes, is the narrower of the two 
because it occurs only when the dispute 
arises from a collective-bargaining agree-
ment. Because Robert Gilmer and Inter-
state were not parties to a collective-bar-
gaining agreement, they engaged in the 
second type, "commercial arbitration," 
which is grounded in the U.S. Arbitration 
Act. Despite their differences, the two 
types of arbitration share many similari-
ties. Later in this article, we will see that 
in the civil-rights sphere, labor arbitra-
tion holds important lessons for its com-
mercial counterpart. 
A party must arbitrate, and thus 
forgo court resolution, only if (like Gilmer) 
the party has agreed to arbitrate. Parties 
may sign an arbitration agreement either 
before or after a dispute arises. Agree-
ments signed after the dispute arises-
so-called postdispute agreements-cause 
little controversy, even in civil-rights 
cases. Our legal system permits parties 
to settle their claims, including claims 
under civil-rights acts. Indeed, more than 
90 percent of civil lawsuits in the federal 
and state courts end in settlement rather 
than in a court decision. Given this score-
card, the parties' postdispute arbitration 
agreement is akin to an agreement to 
have their existing dispute settled by a 
third party, the arbitrator. 
More troublesome are "predispute" 
arbitration agreements , which parties 
may sign long before any dispute actu-
ally arises. Robert Gilmer signed this sort 
of agreement when Interstate hired him, 
six years before he was fired. The prob-
lem with predispute agreements is that 
the party holding superior bargaining 
power (for example, the prospective 
employer) frequently imposes them, often 
in a standard form contract presented on 
a "take it or leave it" basis. The party in 
the weaker position (for example, the 
prospective employee) may not pay par-
ticular attention to the arbitration clause 
amid all the contract's other provisions. If 
the weaker party does pay attention, he 
may not fully understand that by agree-
ing to arbitration, he forfeits the right to 
a day in court on civil-rights claims years 
later. Even if he does understand, he is 
likely to sense that he would lose the job 
opportunity altogether ifhe balks at the 
arbitration clause. 
PRODUCING FAIR CIVIL-RIGHTS 
ARBITRATION 
B ecause predispute arbitration agreements so often result from 
one-sided negotiation, we should 
not allow them to shut the court-
house door to private civil-rights enforce-
ment. Labor arbitration holds an impor-
tant lesson here. Where an employee 
loses on a statutory discrimination claim 
in labor arbitration, the employee may 
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bring a court suit afterward to try to 
establish that claim. The arbitration 
hearing is not necessarily wasted effort, 
because it may resolve the dispute once 
and for all. Where the employee does go to 
court after the arbitration, the court may 
give the arbitrator's decision appropriate 
weight. If the judge determines that the 
arbitrator fully and fairly heard the evi-
dence and considered the employee's 
rights, the court may decide the discrim-
ination claim the same way the arbitrator 
did. But the judge may also correct any 
errors the arbitrator made and may 
decide that the arbitrator's decision was 
wrong. In labor arbitration, then, the final 
word in applying civil-rights law rests 
with the courts, where it belongs. 
The potential for unfairness in com-
mercial arbitration of civil-rights claims is 
largely the fault of Congress. The law-
makers missed a golden opportunity 
when they enacted the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990. The Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 made matters even worse. 
Congress each time backed down 
from enacting safeguards that many law-
makers clearly knew are conducive to fair-
ness when predispute agreements pro-
duce arbitration of civil-rights claims. 
These lawmakers publicly stated that 
civil-rights claimants in commercial arbi-
tration, like their counterparts in labor 
arbitration, should have the right to a 
later trial in which the court would give 
appropriate weight to the arbitrator's deci-
sion. But these statements were made 
only in House and Senate floor debates 
and in published House Judiciary Com-
mittee reports preceding passage of the 
1990 and 1991 acts. Statements made in 
floor debates and reports do not have the 
force oflaw. When all the dust had settled, 
Congress lacked the fortitude to place the 
safeguards in the acts themselves. 
Congress should now finish the work 
it began six years ago. Employees should 
hold the right to seek judicial redress if 
they lose a statutory civil-rights claim in 
commercial arbitration, with courts 
instructed to give appropriate weight to 
the arbitrator's decision. Employers, who 
do not hold the right to sue if they lose on 
civil-rights claims in labor arbitration, 
should not hold the right to sue after los-
ing in commercial arbitration either. 
Employment discrimination statutes pro-
tect employees, not employers. The 
employee will normally be the weaker 
party to the predispute arbitration agree-
ment, frequently unable to meet the bur-
dens and expense of litigation. If the 
employer could sue after losing in arbi-
tration, the employer could frequently 
undo the employee's arbitral victory, not 
because the law is on the employer's side, 
but because the employee could not afford 
to defend the lawsuit. Because it is the 
employer who ordinarily insists on the 
predispute arbitration agreement in the 
first instance, the employer may fairly be 
bound by the arbitrator's decision. 
As a society, we demonstrate our ded-
ication to the rule of law when we insist 
on fair processes for resolving the disputes 
that inevitably arise in our everyday life. 
We should remain particularly vigilant 
when rights guaranteed by our nation's 
civil-rights laws are at stake. When dis-
putes require binding resolution by a neu-
tral decision maker, publicly constituted 
courts rather than private arbitrators 
should be the ultimate guardians of these 
precious rights. ■ 
Douglas E. Abrams is a professor at the University of Missouri Law School in Columbia. His articles 
have been quoted in decisions of the Supreme Court and other federal courts. Last year he wrote about 
civil-rights arbitration in the Connecticut Law Review. 
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